Historical institutionalism and economic policymaking ??? determinants of the pattern of economic policy in Brazil, 1930???1960 by Guimar??es, Alexandre Queiroz
Historical Institutionalism and
Economic Policymaking –
Determinants of the Pattern of
Economic Policy in Brazil,
1930–1960
ALEXANDRE QUEIROZ GUIMARA˜ES
Pontifı´cia Universidade Cato´lica – MG – Brazil, Fundac¸a˜o
Joa˜o Pinheiro
From 1930 to 1960, Brazil adopted a pattern of economic policy marked
by strong state intervention, high levels of protectionism, disregard of
exports and a permissive treatment of inflation. These policies distorted
the model of industrialisation and had a negative impact on the
prospects for economic development. This article employs a historical
institutionalist approach to investigate how the international context,
the ideology of the policymakers, the role of the technocrats and the
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enced decisions on economic policy, contributing to the consolidation
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The objective of this article is to employ historical institutionalism in order to under-
stand the pattern of economic policy adopted in Brazil in the period 1930–1960. In
response to the international crisis of the 1930s, a project of industrialisation based on
import substitution and marked by strong state intervention was defined, pursued with
vigour after 1937 and consolidated in the 1950s. Among the characteristics of this
model were a high degree of protectionism, state control of many prices, relegation of
exports and agriculture to a secondary level of priority and a lax attitude towards
inflation.
The analytical framework of historical institutionalism was first employed by Hall
(1986) in his comparative analysis of Britain and France. Hall, refusing the idea that
economic policy is simply a response to economic problems, developed a systematic
treatment of the political elements which, intertwined with economic factors, led
countries to follow a certain path of development. Although recognising that factors
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such as political culture, the degree of autonomy of the state and the power of social
groups play an important role, Hall argued that these factors are mediated by the
institutional factors present in every society. Regarding the influence of social groups,
for example, Hall, while not ignoring the class interests at stake, emphasised that their
capacity to influence a specific policy is deeply influenced by the institutional factors
that characterise the organisation of the state, the organisation of social groups and the
relations between them (Hall, 1986: 15).
One of Hall’s main objectives was to investigate why, in the face of clear signs of
industrial decline, British governments failed, in the post-war period, to adopt a
consistent industrial policy. He found the answer in the British position in the inter-
national economic system and in the institutional factors that characterised the orga-
nisation of the state and the social groups. First, pressure from financial interests, fruit
of Britain’s role as an international financial centre, explained the government’s reluc-
tance to devalue the pound. In this sense, the difference in interests between industry
and finance prevented unified support for policies to upgrade the industrial structure.
Second, business associations were strong but very fragmented, thus hindering the
achievement of a more wide-ranging position dealing with national problems.
Accordingly, industrialists tended to view the actions of the government with suspicion
and to resist interference in their activities. Third, the labour movement, although
strong, lacked a central confederation with the mechanisms to compel members to
follow its orientation, while the local trade-unions were resistant to any form of state
intervention that affected their autonomy.
Regarding the organisation of the state apparatus, it was marked by the independ-
ence of the Bank of England and by the power of the Treasury – an organ with little
expertise in and commitment to developing industry. In addition, the re-organisation of
the state in the post-war period did not produce an organ with enough capacity to
undertake a programme of industrial adjustment. And finally, the political parties’ high
dependence on social groups reduced their autonomy and willingness to promote the
necessary reforms. In brief, these institutional factors tied the state down: besides the
political culture, which was in itself very resistant to state intervention, the organisa-
tion of the state, of the social groups and of the political system all had a key impact on
the refusal to undertake reforms.
My intention, by using this framework, is to show how different factors combined
to consolidate a pattern of policymaking in Brazil, recognising that the Brazilian case
illustrates important points about Latin America and other developing countries. In
this sense, it is important to emphasise that, in response to the international crisis of the
1930s, many developing countries reacted in a very similar way. As Cox (1987: 236)
stresses, the crisis of the 1930s brought about the emergence of ‘neo-mercantilist
states’, in which the lack of a hegemonic social group made the state ‘the only basis
for the project of an indigenously inspired, populist-flavoured, autonomous direction
to national development’. Although a key agent in the new development process, the
state was not able to reshape society and the process was marked by friction between
several state initiatives and various social groups.
The similarity in the experiences of many countries is very good evidence for the
relevance of the form of insertion into the international economy in accounting for
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different paths of national development. This is an important point emphasised by
Cardoso and Faletto (1970), who see in the configuration of social forces, shaped by a
particular position in the world order, a key factor in understanding the constraints on
economic development. Although dependence is manifested in many ways, including
the lack of technological capacity, the weakness of the industrial bourgeoisie and the
high participation of foreign capital, Cardoso and Faletto show that one key dimension
is political, related to the set of forces which, reinforced by previous patterns of
international insertion, constitute significant constraints on the shaping of a new
economic model.
Brazil provides a very good case study for understanding the challenges of economic
development in Latin American and other developing countries. Although many of its
characteristics were shared by other Latin American countries, the existence of sig-
nificant differences highlighted the influence of certain institutional factors, such as the
characteristics of the state and the role of political culture. Second, Brazil significantly
advanced its process of industrialisation, constituting a successful example of ‘state led
industrialisation’. Nevertheless, the difficulties were also considerable, being, in great
part, related to limits in state capacity, which prevented the replication of the positive
results obtained by the Developmental States in East Asia (Guimara˜es, 2003). In this
sense, one important facet of these limits is manifested in the characteristics of the
policymaking process, constituting imbalances that critically constrained the achieve-
ments of the industrialisation model.
The article does not aim to provide an original treatment of how the factors
discussed affected policymaking in Brazil. Diniz (1978) and Leopoldi (2000) have
already shown the influence of the business class on the pattern of policymaking.
Similarly, Leff (1977), Sikkink (1991) and Bielschowsky (1988) have emphasised the
role of technocrats and ideas, while many articles about economic policy have located
the immediate economic constraints. Nevertheless, to date there has been no attempt to
combine all of these factors systematically. Thorp (1992) undertakes an interesting
analysis of economic policy in Latin America after the Second World War, but she does
not embark on a detailed evaluation of the influence of particular agents, such as
industrialists and technocrats. In brief, my objective is to show how the interaction of
the different factors led to the configuration of a specific pattern of economic policy,
which is critical to understanding the limits of the import substitution industrialisation
process. In order to do so, the article applies Peter Hall’s historical institutionalism
approach, showing how the combination of economic and political factors led to the
emergence of a specific pattern of economic policy.
Distortions in the Pattern of Economic Policymaking
Before considering the pattern in detail and presenting its determinants, it is worth
making some observations about the analytical validity of defining a pattern of eco-
nomic policy. This is necessary because individual governments were marked by
important differences, including the adoption of certain policies that diverged from
the main lines identified in the pattern. For example, although at certain moments
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governments demonstrated their intention to curb inflation, it has to be stressed that
this resolve typically did not last and that an expansionist economic policy generally
prevailed: other priorities led governments to increase expenditure, with consequently
high inflation rates, during most of the period. In brief, although many results were not
the outcome of deliberate government policy, the policies did assume certain general
characteristics, making possible the identification of a general pattern of economic
policy.
The pattern of economic policy was characterised by several distortions, properly
emphasised by Eugenio Gudin, one of the earliest professional economists in Brazil,
and a prominent liberal, who strongly criticised a system of import licences which,
according to him, forbade the importation of any goods that could compete with
national industry. Gudin maintained that the high levels of protectionism practically
eliminated the risks of investment, benefiting specific interest groups at the expense of
the large majority of consumers. His criticisms were also directed against the high rates
of inflation, which discouraged savings and public investments and distorted the system
of prices. Finally, Gudin emphasised how the development model completely neglected
agriculture, an activity in which the country had natural advantages and which had a
key role to play in increasing exports and relieving the pressures on the balance of
payments (Diniz, 1978: 207–208).
These distortions are widely emphasised by analyses centred on the difficulties of
development in Latin America (Balassa, 1982). They stress that high tariffs produced
an inefficient industry, unable to conquer foreign markets. Similarly, the overvalued
exchange rate inhibited exports, both in the agricultural sector and in new industries.
Consequently, the capacity for industrial growth became limited to the expansion of
the domestic market, while poor export performance provoked constant problems in
the balance of payments. Furthermore, high inflation was blamed for producing dis-
tortions and hindering the efficient allocation of resources in the economy. These
characteristics trapped Latin American countries in a vicious circle, marked by ineffi-
cient industry, high inflation, poor export performance, balance-of-payments problems
and constraints on economic growth.
These distortions are often contrasted with the virtues of the export-led industrial-
isation adopted in East Asia. In Korea and Taiwan, where more realistic exchange
rates were adopted and less permissiveness with inflation shown, a virtuous circle
emerged, characterised by high productivity, export growth, expansion in the market,
rapid economic growth and an increase in real wages. In these countries, the conquest
of foreign markets increased the markets available for industrial development and the
country’s capacity to import. Likewise, control of inflation and productivity growth
produced an increase in real wages and a reduction in social inequalities.1
In view of the distortions emphasised above, which negatively affected Brazil’s
capacity for economic development, it is very important to understand how this pattern
1 It is necessary to emphasise that differences in economic policy were not the only
important difference between the two East Asian countries and Latin America. Korea
and Taiwan also had very strong states and a favourable geopolitical position, variables
that strongly improved their chances of success (Guimara˜es, 2003).
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of economic policy came to be adopted. These factors are also important in under-
standing why, in the face of mounting evidence of economic difficulties, corrective
policies were not immediately adopted.
The Brazilian Response in the 1930s
The impact of the crisis of 1930 was felt throughout Latin America, undermining
previous faith in the agro-export model. Nevertheless, the countries’ responses varied
significantly. In Colombia, for example, the weakness of the urban middle classes and
the hegemonic power of the export sector led to policies that did not significantly affect
the structure of the economy. In Argentina, the agrarian elites, which controlled power,
permitted a partial process of industrialisation, mainly in sectors that processed raw
materials available domestically. Manufacturing, nevertheless, suffered following the
signing of an international treaty which, in order to guarantee export markets, opened
the domestic market to the import of manufactured goods (Cardoso and Faletto, 1970:
70–73).
In Brazil, by contrast, the process led to significant changes both in the role and
organisation of the state and in the model of economic development. The regime
installed in 1930 promoted centralisation and the strengthening of the state, preparing
it for a very active role in addressing national problems. Organs were created to
intervene in and regulate the economy, increasing the state’s capacity to design and
execute economic policy and to stimulate economic development. Furthermore, parts
of the public service were modernised and became subject to meritocratic criteria of
selection and promotion (Draibe, 1985).
Second, another central change was the adoption of a deliberate strategy to promote
industrialisation. Before 1930, economic policy had been mainly directed towards
promoting the interests of the coffee bourgeoisie and industrial development took
place only on the fringes of the coffee sector. Although the policies adopted in the
first half of the 1930s were marked by a certain ambivalence, the direction taken after
1937 did not leave any room for doubt about the government’s intention to promote
industrialisation. The government created the Carteira de Cre´dito Agrı´cola e Industrial
do Banco do Brasil (CREAI) to provide long-term loans for industrial projects, and a
range of public enterprises was created in the areas of steel, electrical energy, heavy
chemicals, mining and automobile engines (Draibe, 1985: 125).
It is important to understand why the Brazilian response took the form indicated
above. Apart from the effects of the international crisis, three main factors must be
taken into consideration: the balance between the social forces, the characteristics of
the political culture and the ideology of the political elite. First, the divergences
between the rural aristocracies of different regions and different economic sectors,
together with the influence of the military and the strengthening of the industrial
class, produced a balance of power that increased the autonomous capacity of the
political elite to shape a new economic model. This balance of power is important in
explaining why the agrarian aristocracy was not able to control power and implement
small changes in the development model, as happened in other countries.
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Second, the Brazilian response was deeply influenced by the previous role assumed
by the state and by the characteristics of the political culture. The Brazilian state in the
nineteenth century was more interventionist than any other Latin American state, and
its role was further increased by the demands of the coffee bourgeoisie to regulate the
supply of the product. This intense state influence was supported by a political culture
which, inherited from the mercantilist Portuguese tradition, viewed state intervention
as the best way to address national interests. Thus, in response to the problems and
contradictions of the First Republic (1889–1930), when the adoption of a decentralised
federalist arrangement allowed the rural oligarchies to capture the state and use it to
pursue their immediate interests, the opposition defended the return of a strong state as
the only way to pursue the necessities of national development. In this sense, the
previous role of the state and the characteristics of the political culture are key to
understanding the directions that marked the re-organisation of the state and the
shaping of the economic model after 1930 (Faoro, 1998; Guimara˜es, 2003).
Therefore, the balance between the social forces and the characteristics of the political
culture continued to increase the autonomy of the political elite and the influence of its
ideology on the definition of the economic model to be adopted. This ideology, which was
much influenced by positivism, favoured the ‘search for technical solutions’ to political
issues, the adoption of a corporatist pattern of interest representation and the promotion
of industrialisation as the most suitable strategy for national development. Nevertheless, it
is important not to disregard the role of the social forces present in the power coalition.
The revolution of 1930 was not a radical rupture, and the new regime was marked by the
consolidation of a very broad and heterogeneous political coalition. In this sense, as
Draibe (1985) emphasises, if the disputes between the classes gave autonomy to the
state, the composition and relative power of those classes established the limits of this
autonomy and determined also the possible directions to be imposed on economic policy.2
In conclusion, by the end of the 1930s, important characteristics of the development
model had been consolidated. The state substantially increased its role in economic
activity, and industrialisation was promoted as the most suitable strategy for achieving
national development. Other important characteristics, such as the creation of corporative
councils that gave business groups privileged channels of access to policymaking, had a
significant influence in the following decades. In brief, key transformations introduced in
the 1930s were maintained and gradually became institutionalised in the following
decades, eventually coming to constitute crucial features of the model of industrialisation.
Common Factors in Latin American Economic Policy in
the Post-War Period
Before emphasising certain specifics of the Brazilian process, it is important to explore
some characteristics shared by other Latin American countries. These points in
2 As examples, those groups limited the capacity of the state to increase tax and vetoed
the creation of a central planning organ. The adoption of more radical reforms, such as
an agrarian reform, was out of the question.
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common indicate the influence of geopolitical factors and also the impact of a country’s
position in the world economic system. In the immediate post-war period, the Latin
American nations demonstrated strong support for the emergence of a liberal eco-
nomic order, marked by low tariffs and free trade. The International Conference of
Rye, in November 1944, supported a reduction in tariffs, the elimination of quotas
and an end to discriminatory practices (Diniz, 1978: 214). Similarly, in 1945, the
Inter-American Conference prescribed a reduction in tariffs and the adoption of
policies favourable to foreign capital, while nationalist practices and the creation of
public enterprises were condemned (Thorp, 1992: 190). Nevertheless, a few years
later, liberalism was abandoned and protectionism was again on the agenda. This
common reaction indicated a widespread frustration with US foreign policy, which
was marked by the lack of any programme of economic support for the region.
Accordingly, protectionist measures were motivated by balance-of-payments pro-
blems, which were not addressed by the institutions of the new world order created
at Bretton Woods.
Another interesting similarity was the decision of many Latin American countries
not to devalue their respective currencies after the Second World War. A fixed
exchange rate was maintained for a long period, despite high inflation in most of the
countries. Several factors help to explain this decision. First, the inelasticity in inter-
national demand for agricultural products eliminated the advantages of devaluation to
the exporters. Second, the governments were afraid that devaluation would have an
explosive impact on inflation. Third, the combination of an overvalued exchange rate
and a system of import licences provided, in several countries, important gains for
industrialists. Fourth, the system of import licenses provided importers with ample
opportunities for profit (Thorp, 1992: 194).
As a consequence of such a policy, foreign investment became a very attractive
alternative, since it not only helped the balance of payments, but also allowed the
ruling groups to deepen the process of industrialisation without undertaking a politic-
ally costly process of adjustment (Thorp, 1992: 195). Thus, the advantages offered by
foreign investment explain why it was very welcome on the continent, despite the
prevalence of an ideology of nationalism. One important consequence is that the
fragility of the balance of payments gave foreign enterprises substantial bargaining
power, helping to explain the local governments’ apparent incapacity to regulate and
monitor their activities. One interesting exception was Colombia, where the power of
coffee planters prevented the adoption of overvalued exchange rates. This alleviated
balance-of-payments pressures and increased the government’s bargaining power in
negotiations with foreign capital (Thorp, 1992: 194–195).
The development model adopted in Latin America was also strongly influenced by
ideological factors. Sikkink (1991: 51) emphasises how the effects of the crisis of the
1930s influenced the political elites towards models of development centred on the
domestic market. This pessimism in relation to foreign markets helps to explain the
adoption of import substitution, although export promotion strategies would have
received much more financial support from international agencies. After the Second
World War, the ideas of the Economic Commission for Latin America (CEPAL), which
theorised about the specifics of development in Latin America, gave legitimacy to
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programmes of development centred on import substitution and marked by high tariffs
and elevated state intervention.
This ideological influence, which was possible because of the governments’ capacity
to circumvent the demands of the international financial institutions, is apparent when
one observes the differences in the pattern of economic policy adopted in Korea and
Taiwan. In the 1950s, these countries developed many characteristics typical of import
substitution industrialisation, in a process marked by clientelism, multiple exchange
rate regimes and lobbying from the import substitution industries aiming at reducing
the entry of competitors. Similarly, the respective governments demonstrated resistance
to currency devaluation, to simplification of the exchange rate regime and to curbing
inflation. As a consequence, the process was marked by the emergence of several
distortions, such as high inflation, inefficiency and disincentives to exports (Haggard,
1990: 57–59, 85–90).
As Haggard (1990) shows, a turning point was the capacity of the US advisers to
impose changes in the development strategy of highly aid-dependent Korea and
Taiwan, such as stabilisation programmes, currency devaluation and a simplification
of the exchange rate regime. Thus, this influence of US authorities was critical to the
shaping of economic policy and to the adoption of measures that favoured an increase
in exports (Haggard, 1990: 68–71, 91–93).3
As argued above, the situation was very different in Latin America, where orthodox
economic ideas were viewed with distrust and considered unsuitable for the reality of
the continent. CEPAL developed an alternative theoretical interpretation that won
support among politicians and technocrats. Consequently, although CEPAL con-
demned many distortions practised in these countries, its ideas contributed to the
legitimation of a model of industrialisation centred on high tariffs and a laissez-faire
approach to inflation. As a consequence, they increased the politicians’ capacity to
adopt measures that aggravated the distortions even further.
The International Context and Brazilian Policies after 1945
It is important to emphasise that certain policies were reversed in Brazil as a result of
US foreign policy and low levels of foreign investment. In addition to its initial liberal
orientation in trade policy, the Dutra government (1946–1950) demonstrated a strict
commitment to controlling inflation and very positive results were achieved in 1948
and 1949. Nevertheless, the direction was not maintained after 1949. Besides the
industrialists’ pressures for credit and the government’s objective of winning the elec-
tions, the change was motivated by the fact that more liberal economic policies had not
3 Another important difference between Latin America and East Asia was the relative
power of the various social forces. In Korean and Taiwan, the agrarian groups, the
labour movement and the import substitution interests were much weaker than in
Brazil and Mexico. Consequently, while American pressure was fundamental to
explaining the governments’ disposition to change economic policy, the weakness of
social groups increased their capacity to do so.
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produced the expected results. Foreign capital did not materialise, reducing the policy-
makers’ faith in the advantages of an orthodox policy.
Similarly, the Vargas government demonstrated a disposition to control inflation in
1951 and 1952. The agreements with international financial institutions and the
possibility of obtaining resources to finance projects in infrastructure convinced the
government of the suitability of a stabilisation programme. Nevertheless, the victory of
Eisenhower in the US elections, the subsequent change in US priorities and the disputes
between the World Bank and the Eximbank frustrated the plans. The Eisenhower
government did not honour the previous administration’s commitment to finance the
projects, while the World Bank forced Eximbank to adopt stricter conditions in the
concession of loans (Vianna, 1990: 132). From 1953 onwards, difficulties in stabilising
the economy increased: the government expanded expenditure in infrastructure, while
political difficulties hindered the adoption of a firm programme of stabilisation.
In brief, the international context and the objectives of US foreign policy had an
important impact on economic policy decisions. The European economies were under
reconstruction and the elasticity of Brazilian exports was indeed low, explaining in part
Brazilian pessimism regarding the capacity of trade to spur economic development.
Similarly, direct foreign investment was mainly directed towards Europe, while Brazil
suffered because of the lack of an international aid programme and with the changes in
US priorities. As a consequence and in the face of significant domestic challenges, the
response was an increase in state investments in infrastructure and heavy industry.
Given the political obstacles to increasing taxes and to reforming the financial system,
compounded by the lack of institutional capacity to do so, the strict control of inflation
became a very hard task.
The Technocrats and the Role of Ideology
Sikkink (1991) and Leff (1977) argue that ideology and political culture are key
variables in understanding the specific development pattern adopted in Brazil.
According to Sikkink, the political culture was very favourable to state intervention
and facilitated the acceptance of developmentalism by the different social groups.
Sikkink (1991) also emphasises the role of technocrats: the creation of public bodies
of economic studies, in the 1930s and 1940s, produced technocrats who, concerned to
identify the best options for economic development, contributed to increasing support
for industrialisation programmes aimed at reducing foreign dependency.
Similarly, Leff (1977), drawing on interview evidence, attaches considerable import-
ance to the technocrats’ autonomy and to the role of ideology in the economic policy-
making process. Leff (1977: 135) emphasises how the existence of technocrats with
similar views, staffing important organs in subsequent governments, explains why the
lines of economic policy ‘have been relatively constant since the end of the 1940s’.
According to Leff, this explains the distortions that marked the process of industrial-
isation: the policymakers shared points of view that were considered so self-evident
that they were incorporated as axioms, without an accurate analysis of the alternative
lines of economic policy. As Leff (1977: 127) points out, ‘because of ideology, there
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were no debates about issues such as industrial development versus development of
agriculture; light industry versus heavy industry; or import substitution versus the
promotion of exports’.
According to Leff, the political elite defended a priori an import substitution model
based on heavy industry. As these ‘self-evident truisms’ did not necessarily coincide
with reality, this process was vulnerable to the adoption of inconsistent policies. This is
very well illustrated by the adoption of an export policy which, as it was considered
secondary by the economic policymakers, was inadequately conceived and contributed
significantly to the imbalances that marked the industrialisation strategy (Leff, 1977:
126–127). Leff also emphasises the implications of an ideology that was very permis-
sive in relation to inflation. According to Leff (1977: 143), the trade-off embraced by
the policymakers was not between inflation and stability, but between inflation and
development versus stabilisation and stagnation. President Kubitschek (1956–1960),
for example, believed that to address the national problems with stabilisation was to
use the wrong medicine (Sikkink, 1991: 123). Instead, he believed that expansion in
expenditure via printing of money, if used to produce investment, would not provoke
inflation. Vargas espoused similar ideas. Consequently, a certain amount of inflation
was seen as inevitable and as a small price to pay for economic development.
Sola (1982) and Bielschowsky (1988) argue that Leff underestimates the divergences
between the technocrats. As Bielschowsky (1988: 427) argues, the period 1953–1955
was marked by the technocrats becoming conscious of ‘the importance of political
struggle in the intellectual field’. This led to an intensification in their attempts to
influence the course of economic development.4 Sola and Bielschowsky classified these
technocrats into three main categories. Their main issues of divergence were the degree
of protectionism, the role of foreign capital, the degree and nature of state intervention
in the economy and the priority to be given to the fight against inflation.
The first group, the neoliberals, emphasised the necessity of controlling inflation,
reducing state intervention, ending price controls and giving a central role to private
initiative. This group was very critical of the development model adopted since the
1930s, which had been marked by strong government intervention, very high levels of
protectionism and a permissive treatment of inflation. The public deficit was seen as
the main cause of inflation, which, in turn, was responsible for the main distortions
present in the economy. According to this group, high inflation also bore a key
responsibility for balance-of-payments difficulties, since it discouraged both domestic
saving and foreign investment.
A second group, the ‘developmentalist cosmopolitans’, shared some views with the
neoliberals, such as the important role attributed to foreign capital and the necessity of
keeping inflation under control. Nevertheless, they supported planning and believed
that the state had a critical role in guiding the process of industrialisation, specifically
the provision of incentives to private investment, playing an entrepreneurial role in
4 Sola (1982) shows in detail the involvement of the technocrats in this process. They
organised themselves in clubs, edited journals, gave lectures at universities and military
schools, contacted business organisations and worked as advisers to political parties
and economic groups.
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high-risk sectors, and the undertaking of institutional reforms ‘aimed at mobilising and
channelling both the human and financial resources to priority targets’ (Sola, 1982:
113). In this sense, the cosmopolitans also had points in common with the third group,
the ‘nationalist developmentalists’. Both groups supported a central role for the state in
centralising financial and administrative resources and in planning the process of
development (Bielschowsky, 1988: 398).
The ‘nationalist developmentalists’ centred their argument on the structural prob-
lems inherent to peripheral countries that had historically been agro-export economies.
The group identified serious structural deficiencies in the Brazilian economy, which
included low productivity, limited diversification, shortfalls in capital and technical
resources and a lack of basic infrastructure services. They further identified the exis-
tence of structural problems in the balance of payments, a result of the slow increase in
the international demand for primary products and of the deterioration in the terms of
trade for these products.
According to the nationalists, the possibility of economic development thus required a
process of industrialisation led by the state. Industrialisation, by permitting the substitu-
tion of imports and the export of goods with high-income elasticity, was seen as the only
way to reverse the structural difficulties in the balance of payments. Likewise, state
intervention, through a process of planning, was supported because it was seen as
necessary to the creation of external economies and to the generation of rationality in
the absorption and allocation of resources (Bielschowsky, 1988: 386). One important
consequence of the nationalist developmentalist argument was the permissive treatment
of inflation. Once the solution of the structural problems demanded an increase in public
investment, a certain level of inflation and national deficits would necessarily have to be
tolerated. In other words, increases in investment and in production were supported,
even though they generated inflation in the short term, because of their capacity to defeat
the real and long-term problems in the economy.
The nationalists showed a high degree of mobilisation and had substantial influence
in the policymaking process. Many factors were responsible for their success. First,
they were supported by the industrialists, who created technical organs and sponsored
studies to advance their respective positions. Second, a nationalist program of indus-
trialisation was supported by the military, concerned to keep control of strategic
industries in Brazilian hands. Third, a set of ideas that valued a process of planning
tended to receive support from a substantial part of the bureaucracy. And last but not
least, by supporting investment and tolerating inflation, the nationalist model tended to
receive enthusiastic endorsement from politicians.5
The three different positions illuminate important issues concerning the development
programme. During the Vargas and Kubitschek governments, the cosmopolitans and the
nationalist developmentalists occupied key posts in the government and had substantial
influence in the policymaking process. The government’s main priority was to deepen
industrialisation, and technocrats were brought into the policymaking process in an effort
5 In addition, the position of the developmentalists was strengthened by the publication
of the theses of CEPAL, an organisation that enjoyed considerable international pres-
tige (Furtado, 1997: 208).
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to give rationality to the process. Combating inflation was given a lower priority, despite
the criticisms of the cosmopolitans such as Roberto Campos and Lucas Lopes, the
architects of the frustrated programme of economic stabilisation in 1958.
The Industrialists and the Development Model
An important element in shaping economic policy was the role played by industrial
businessmen. Although the state increased its capacity to intervene and became more
insulated in certain areas, the industrialists had important channels, dating back to the
1930s, through which to introduce their demands and they thereby exerted significant
influence on economic policy. Leopoldi (2000) shows how, during the Dutra govern-
ment, the influence of business was much more considerable than is usually accepted.
The Minister of Labour, Industry and Trade was a leader of the Federation of
Industries of Sa˜o Paulo (FIESP), and business people were very active in imposing
their directions through campaigns and personal contacts. Accordingly, Congress was
very frequently lobbied and pressured.
One important objective of the industrialists during the Dutra government was to
guarantee that the foreign exchange accumulated during the war would only be utilised
according to defined criteria. In addition, they engaged in fierce mobilisation against the
main conclusions of the Abbink Mission, which prescribed an orthodox program of
stabilisation centred on credit control (Bielschowsky, 1988: 385). The industrialists’ posi-
tion against stabilisation programmes was maintained in the following years.6 Another
stance of the industrialists during the Dutra government was their opposition to currency
devaluation. Instead, they supported ‘protection against devaluation of other currencies’,
participation of the business class in international trade agreements and incentives to
exports (Leopoldi, 2000: 186). Furthermore, they considered a programme of import
substitution to be the best way to solve the structural problems in the balance of payments.
Business influence was strengthened during the second Vargas government
(1951–1954). The nationalist position of the President put the industrialists in a very
privileged position. The creation of the Assessoria Econoˆmica, responsible for supply-
ing direct advice to the president and staffed with several technocrats who had pre-
viously worked in the business associations, also contributed to increasing the
industrialists’ voice in the government. Business influence was particularly important
in policies on tariffs and foreign trade. The industrialists had many contacts and easy
access to those bodies responsible for the respective policies, Carteira de Exportac¸a˜o e
Importac¸a˜o (CEXIM) and the Carteira de Caˆmbio do Banco do Brasil. The president of
the Confederac¸a˜o Nacional da Indu´stria (CNI), Euvaldo Lodi, had weekly meetings
with President Vargas and also had very frequent contacts with authorities of the
6 During the Cafe´ Filho government (1954–1955), for example, the industrialists were
strong opponents of the programme of monetary stabilisation proposed by the Finance
Minister Eugenio Gudin. They pressured the governor of Sa˜o Paulo and led President
Cafe´ Filho to change the policy on credit. This interference provoked the resignation of
Gudin and the appointment of a new Finance Minister, who loosened control over the
monetary policy (Leopoldi, 2000: 242).
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Banco do Brasil, CEXIM and the Superintendeˆncia da Moeda e do Cre´dito (SUMOC,
the organ responsible for the control and supervision of the monetary and financial
policy). Finally, the industrialists gained access to Itamaraty, the organ responsible for
foreign policy, and won a guaranteed right to participate in the consultative commis-
sion on trade agreements (Leopoldi, 2000: 139, 194).
The following examples illustrate the influence of the industrialists during the period. On
the eve of the Korean War, they lobbied intensively within the government and participated in
a definition of the imports necessary to protect the country against the risk of a long war
(Leopoldi, 2000: 144, 191). In 1953, the industrialists strongly criticised the adoption of
Instruction 70 of SUMOC, a law that created a multiple exchange rate regime, without
previous consultation with their representatives. After that, the business class had influence
on all important foreign exchange policy issues, including changes in Instruction 70.7
During the Kubitschek government, the industrialists maintained important chan-
nels open to introduce their demands and had access to an area that was strategic to
their interests, that of tariff policy. Although the foreign exchange policy became more
insulated, the industrialists had a seat in the Conselho de Polı´tica Aduaneira (Council
of Tariff Policy). Furthermore, the communication between business groups and gov-
ernment was favoured by the creation of the Grupos de Trabalho and Grupos
Executivos, which brought together representatives of the public and private sectors
to elaborate and implement industrial policy in the respective sectors.
In conclusion, business influence was intense during the period. Although the state
increased insulation in certain areas, the industrialists had strategic channels to intro-
duce their demands and to bring pressure to bear in pursuit of their interests. As
Leopoldi (2000) shows, the industrial bourgeoisie, although not a hegemonic force,
had influence and the government could not disregard their interests. Although the
bureaucracy achieved autonomy in certain issues, being able to adopt unpopular
measures, it had to negotiate and offer concessions in other areas.8 In brief, the
industrialists played a key role in the definition of a pattern of economic policy marked
by high tariffs, an overvalued exchange rate and a permissive treatment of inflation.
Economic Challenges and the Role of the Social Groups
In the 1930s, in the face of the serious crisis that shook the structures of the agrarian
export economy, the state was called on to play many functions in the restructuring of
the economic system. In the following years, the state deepened its intervention,
addressing issues considered critical to national development. In those years, the
7 During the Cafe´ Filho government, the industrialists strongly criticised Instruction 113
of SUMOC, which authorised the importation of machine and equipment without
exchange rate cover. One important consequence of Instruction 113 was that it reduced
the influence of the business class over foreign investment policy (Leopoldi, 2000: 247–
248).
8 This helps to explain the Brazilian state’s incapacity to make the offer of subsidies and
incentives conditional upon an increase in competitiveness, a key component of the
success of the Developmental States in East Asia (Guimara˜es, 2003).
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international context remained highly complex, eliminating, as has already been seen,
the possibility of a smooth integration into the international market. In this sense, there
were significant economic challenges, including the urgent necessity of public invest-
ments in infrastructure, which were very important in determining the choices of the
Brazilian presidents. Such an overall context demanded a strong state and a process of
intervention able to correct the imbalances of the previous process of industrialisation.
In order to evaluate the constraints on state action, it is necessary to take into considera-
tion the very broad coalition that, since the 1930s, had to be taken into account in the
political process. This included segments of the agrarian oligarchies, the industrial bourgeoisie
and the middle classes, while the incorporation of the labour movement was necessary to
avoid instability. The influence of these heterogeneous social groups, demanding policies that
addressed their concerns, reduced the degree of government freedom. These forces were well
represented in Congress, well organised to block reforms that disregarded their interests and
well prepared to resist any strict stabilisation programme.
The difficulties were aggravated by the strengthening of the labour movement in the
1950s. Although labour was never a partner in the policymaking process, it signifi-
cantly increased its demands and, through strikes and demonstrations, became a
significant source of instability. Both Vargas and Kubitschek had to go some way
towards meeting workers’ concerns, adopting policies that outraged the conservative
groups. In this sense, the difficulties in conciliating such heterogeneous interests explain
in great part the challenges of governing that marked each government. The possibility
of accommodation was hindered by the lack of political parties able to aggregate
demands and achieve negotiated solutions. The two main parties, PSD and UDN,
represented basically the same interests and were divided mainly by their previous
support or opposition to Vargas. Meanwhile, the deepening of industrialisation inten-
sified the divergences between the PSD, a conservative party, and the PTB, a party that
aggregated the trade unions and other popular sectors. This made it impossible for the
coalition that supported Kubitschek to maintain itself, thereby creating an explosive
source of instability.
Consequently, the governments faced many pressures and had to reconcile very different
interests, while the low degree of development precluded the implementation of widespread
compensatory policies. In addition, the governments faced the risk of a military coup, in a
democratic system that did not have deep roots. In such a context, it is not difficult to
understand their preference for accelerating the process of industrialisation. The respective
presidents, who believed in the critical role of the state in the modernisation of the country,
prioritised increasing public investments and expansionist policies. Kubitschek, for example,
had been a very entrepreneurial governor and had ambitious plans. After the political
difficulties and the attempted coup that marked his inauguration, he was not willing to
give up his Target Programme in order to adopt a programme of stabilisation.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the international context, the political culture, the role of the technocrats
and the influence of the social groups, especially the industrialists, were decisive factors
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in explaining the pattern of economic policy adopted in Brazil in the period
1930–1960. In the face of the existing challenges and political pressures, a very strong
external influence was necessary to force the policymakers to change direction. As has
been seen, the international community did not do this, at the same time as the
developmentalist ideology endorsed by CEPAL lent legitimacy to practices that gave
stabilisation and adjustment secondary importance.
Although the analysis is limited to a specific period, certain features are relevant to
subsequent years. After the military coup, in 1964, the government devalued the
exchange rate and modified the exchange rate regime, giving significant stimulus to
exports. Nevertheless, inflation, after a successful stabilisation program during
1964–1967, increased again in the 1970s. The search for political support favoured
the adoption of expansionist policies, while the business class steadfastly resisted any
stabilisation package. In addition, ideology continued to lend support to increasing
state intervention and to a permissive treatment of inflation. At the end of the decade,
inflation and balance-of-payments problems became very serious indeed, becoming key
components of the severe crisis that paralysed the Brazilian economy in the 1980s.
The severity of the crisis prepared the conditions for the emergence of a very
different pattern of economic policy in the 1990s, marked by a completely different
role for the state and by a distinct form of insertion into the new economic interna-
tional order. Changes in the economic order, reducing the instruments available for
state intervention, radically altered the viability of the previous model of industrialisa-
tion. Very important in this process of change was the severe economic crisis, which
left few alternatives open to governments and was critical to overcoming the inbuilt
resistances to the implementation of liberal reforms. In addition, trade liberalisation
gave the business class a different role in the new economic order, while economists
and other technocrats, graduated from US universities, became key agents in the
implementation of the liberal reforms. In brief, a very different pattern of economic
policy assumed a place in developing countries; a historical institutionalist analysis, as
undertaken in this article, remains very useful for understanding the similarities and the
differences in the respective responses.
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